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Private Parties, Legislators, and the Government’s Mantle:
On Intervention and Article III Standing
By Suzanne B. Goldberg1
Abstract
This essay takes up questions regarding whether initiative proponents and
legislators can defend a law in federal court when the government declines to
defend. Looking first at intervention under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I
argue that neither has the cognizable interest needed to enter an ongoing lawsuit
as a party. Yet even if they are allowed to intervene, these would-be defenders of
state or federal law cannot take on the government’s mantle to satisfy Article III
because the government’s standing derives from the risk to its enforcement
powers, which is an interest that cannot be delegated to others. Nor can they
make out any more than a desire to have the law enforced consistent with their
views, which is the sort of generalized grievance the Supreme Court has long
rejected as a basis for standing.
Yet numerous courts have permitted intervention and accorded standing to
these types of intervenors, including in the marriage cases before the Supreme
Court in the 2012 term. We can understand this unduly generous approach as a
part of a larger phenomenon at the crossroads of procedure and judicial
legitimacy. In these high-vulnerability contexts, where courts are asked to decide
the constitutionality of popular measures, legitimacy concerns, including what I
term countermajoritarian anxiety and guilt, permeate procedural decisionmaking
and, at times, override otherwise operative procedural constraints.
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I.

Introduction

Imagine a town called Defendantville in Anystate, USA. If ever Anystate’s
governor and attorney general decline to defend a voter-initiated law, they can
designate someone in Defendantville to defend the law in their stead. None of
Defendantville’s residents has the power to enforce the state’s laws but, for the
limited purpose of defending those laws in court, any of them can take on the
mantle of Anystate’s sovereignty. Now imagine, instead, that a federal statute is
being challenged. The government has declined to defend, and a group of
lawmakers steps in. This group, too, claims the government’s mantle and seeks to
enter the lawsuit as defendants.
The questions that prompt this Essay arise at the point when these lawsuits
are brought in federal court: First, can states delegate their sovereignty – and with
it, their Article III standing – to private parties for purposes of defending their
laws?2 Second, can a subset of legislators take up a measure’s defense when the
executive branch refuses? The first, of course, implicates what the Ninth Circuit
permitted in Perry v. Brown, when California declined to defend Proposition 8, a
voter-initiated measure that withdrew marriage rights from same-sex couples, and
the court agreed to decide an appeal from the proposition’s sponsors.3 And the
second reflects what numerous federal courts have permitted to the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives, which stepped in when the
Department of Justice decided no longer to defend the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).4
Through attention to both doctrine and judicial legitimacy dynamics, this
essay shows that Article III standing cannot be delegated from governments to
individuals in this way, even when those individuals are elected officials. The
legal argument here proceeds in three steps. We begin pre-constitutionally, with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) – specifically, with an extended
2

Standing is an essential element of Article III’s “bedrock” case or controversy requirement. See
Raines v. Byrd at 819. For more detailed doctrinal discussion, see infra at xx.
3
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (2012), cert. granted sub nom Hollingsworth v. Brown, 2012
WL 3134429 (Mem.) (Dec. 7, 2012) (directing the parties to address “whether petitioners have
standing under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case”).
4
For extended discussion of BLAG and its role in the DOMA litigation, see infra at xx. In
granting the writ of certiorari in United States v. Windsor, the Court added this question to the
merits-related question about DOMA’s constitutionality. See U.S. v. Windsor, 2012 WL 4009654
(Mem) (Dec. 7, 2012) ( directing the parties to address the question “whether the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in the
case.”).
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discussion of Rule 24 intervention. While Rule 24 provides the procedural entrée
for outsiders to become parties in an ongoing lawsuit, access is restricted to those
with cognizable interests closely related to the litigation. Passionate commitment
to the issue before the court does not count; for this reason, most initiative
proponents do not qualify. Although they invest heavily in a measure’s success,
they typically do not experience a change to their own legal status when a measure
passes that would translate to the sort of interest Rule 24 requires.5
The discussion then turns to Article III. Through an inquiry into why
governments have standing to defend their laws, it becomes clear that government
standing cannot be imputed to private actors or individual legislators, even when
those actors have engaged in the lawmaking process. When a statute is
challenged, governments have the concrete and specific interest that basic standing
doctrine requires6 because their authority to enforce their own laws is subject to
diminishment. Private parties and even individual legislators, by contrast, do not
have this same stake because they do not have and cannot exercise the
government’s enforcement power. Consequently, governments cannot properly
extend the Article III standing associated with their enforcement powers to these
individuals and organizations either explicitly or by implication.
Next, absent the government’s mantle, we see that most initiative
proponents and lawmakers also cannot establish standing by the conventional
means available to federal court litigants who seek redress for an injury. As noted
above, voter initiatives typically do not alter their proponents’ rights vis a vis the
general population in a way that would give rise to a concrete, particular claim.
This is certainly the case for Proposition 8’s promoters, whose right to marry was
left unaffected by the measure they helped pass. The same is true for those
legislators who would defend DOMA, or any other measure they supported. In
these contexts, the grievance amounts to a demand for government to enforce its
laws in a particular way rather for redress of an individualized injury caused by the
government’s action. This law enforcement claim is not particular to the
measure’s strongest supporters. Instead, anyone in the population might make it,

5

Although the discussion here will continue for the sake of comprehensiveness and to illuminate
synergies between intervention and standing jurisprudence, intervention law is sufficient, on its
own, to resolve most questions about initiative promoters’ entry into litigation. Indeed, in Perry,
which is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, while the plaintiffs-respondents have
arguably waived their objection to the misapplication of Rule 24 by the lower courts, there is no bar
to the Supreme Court resolving the case on this procedural ground.
6

See infra at xx.
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which is why standing jurisprudence has long found it to be inadequate for Article
III courts.7
Because intervention and standing jurisprudence are relatively clear in
rebuffing party status for initiative proponents and individual legislators, as just
discussed, something more than a doctrinal misunderstanding must be enabling
these actors to become defendants in federal litigation. The remainder of the
Essay explores why some federal courts have been overly generous in allowing
intervention and finding standing for these would-be defenders. By looking at
intervention and standing decisions across contexts, including in Perry and in the
DOMA litigation, we can see this deviation from procedural rules in relief. It is, I
argue, part of a larger phenomenon at the crossroads of procedure and judicial
legitimacy, where judicial legitimacy concerns appear to permeate procedural
decisionmaking and override otherwise operative procedural constraints.
It is not surprising that litigation involving voter-initiated and otherwise
popular measures present a high-vulnerability context for courts that are sensitive
to their countermajoritarian position.8 But it is striking how far procedural
decisionmaking in these cases may wind up deviating from what the governing
rules and doctrine would seem to require, even when courts are willing to strike
down these measures on the merits.
In these contexts, procedural deviation functions as a kind of release valve
that federal courts use, probably inadvertently, to signal engagement with and
accountability to the public. Especially in decisions regarding intervention by
initiative proponents, two related legitimacy concerns come to the fore. One I
characterize as countermajoritarian guilt. This concern draws from Lockean
notions of fairness and procedural due process rhetoric and reflects the impulse
that it is unfair to block initiative promoters from defending their measures after
they put in the work to obtain passage. The other I describe as countermajoritarian
anxiety to capture courts’ concern that the adjudication process will be both tainted
and ineffectual if the promoters of a challenged measure are denied full party
status.

7

See Lujan at 573-74 (stating that an abstract interest in the government’s “proper application of
the Constitution and laws” is insufficient, of itself, for Article III standing). In U.S. v. Robinson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974), the Court rejected standing for an individual who sought a report on Central
Intelligence Agency expenditures under the Constitution’s Accounts Clause. Although the plaintiff
argued that not having this information would limit his ability to vote, the Court held, per Chief
Justice Burger, that “[t]his is surely a generalized grievance since the impact on him is plainly
undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.” Id. at xx
8
See infra at xx.
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My ultimate claim here is that although these concerns warrant serious
attention, loosening intervention law is a costly and ultimately flawed way to
address them. Allowing initiative promoters and groups of lawmakers to intervene
as full parties, and then to appeal without a concomitant appeal by a government
defendant, defies the intervention rules’ text and weakens Article III’s constraints.
Even worse, this trend blurs the lines of what entities federal courts will count as
governments and what interests courts will treat as governmentally-sanctioned.
These concerns do not suggest that proponents should be absent from litigation
involving their measures, however. Instead, amicus status – including “litigating
amicus” status, as needed – is far more appropriate, doctrinally and otherwise, to
insure that the federal courts operate with both constitutional integrity and public
legitimacy.
II.

An Opening Question: Intervention’s Scope and Limits

When plaintiffs challenge a law’s constitutionality, even in the case of a
voter-initiated law, they nearly always sue government officials. The reason is
straightforward: the remedy they need, most often, is a court order blocking those
officials from enforcing the challenged law.9 By contrast, participation is not so
automatic for initiative proponents; instead, typically, proponents must move to
intervene. This section looks to intervention law’s gatekeeping function, then, as
the threshold inquiry to be addressed even before the question of standing for nonstate actors.
As any first year law student knows, intervention in federal court comes in
two types – intervention of right, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and
permissive intervention under F.R.C.P. 24(b).10 In essence, intervention of right is

9

In these cases, the designated defendant is sometimes the governor, and at others, it is the
attorney general or the head of the relevant state agency, but in all instances, the defendant is an
official representative of the state. The reason that plaintiffs sue an official rather than the state
itself flows in part from the statute that authorizes federal suits for state-based violations of
constitutional rights, which creates a cause of action against persons who deprive others of
constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. More significantly, sovereign immunity doctrine bars
the state from being sued directly. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157–58, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52
L.Ed. 714 (1908) Still, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Perry v. Brown, at 1071, “ in a suit for an
injunction against enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state law, it makes no practical
difference whether the formal party before the court is the state itself or a state officer in his official
capacity.”
Of course, there are instances where constitutional challenges to state laws might arise in
suits against local government units or private parties. Typically in these cases, a procedural rule
requires that the state attorney general receive notice of the challenge and, often, an opportunity to
participate in the law’s defense. [cites]
10
Rule 24 provides in full:
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allowed when non-parties have a sufficient interest in the action’s subject matter
and will not be able to protect that interest if they are not named a party to the
suit.11 If an existing party adequately represents the would-be intervenor’s
interest, however, intervention is denied.12 Permissive intervention under F.R.C.P.
R.24(b) requires less; the proposed intervenor need only have “a claim or defense
that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.”13 The federal
rules also instruct courts to consider whether the new permissive intervenor “will
unduly delay or prejudice” the parties in the existing litigation.14
Underlying this straightforward text we find, not surprisingly, a host of
questions. For would-be intervenors of right, we need to know, for example, how
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is
given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.
(b) Permissive Intervention. (1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to
intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim
or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. (2) By a Government
Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental officer
or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order
administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement
issued or made under the statute or executive order. (3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its
discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.
(c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to intervene must be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5. The motion must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading
that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
Considerations of timeliness are also paramount for courts in adjudicating intervention
motions. [cites to come] Because those considerations are typically not present in the types of
cases I focus on here, I do not address them in depth. The district court’s timeliness assessment is
ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion; the circuits vary in how closely they review district
court decisions regarding the other FRCP 24(a) factors. [cites] The rule also allows intervention by
those with statutory authorization but no statutes authorize intervention for the initiative proponents
and subsets of lawmakers I focus on here so, again, I do not discuss the portions of the intervention
rule that address that issue.
More generally, it is well settled that the rule is to be construed liberally. [cites to come]
At the same time, however, despite its label, intervention of right is not absolute; courts retain
discretion to deny intervention, particularly where movants will not contribute distinctly to the
litigation. In granting parents’ motion to intervene in a school desegregation suit, Judge Bazelon
observed that the "decision whether intervention of right is warranted thus involves an
accommodation between two potentially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial economies of scale
by resolving related issues in a single lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from becoming
fruitlessly complex or unending." Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
12
See infra at xx.
13
F.R.C.P. R.24(b).
14
Id.
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much of an interest the proposed intervenor must have in the lawsuit’s subject
matter. Likewise, we need to know the conditions under which the intervenor’s
ability to protect that interest will be impaired, and how much similarity must exist
between the proposed intervenor and an existing party to find that the intervenor is
already adequately represented in the litigation. For would-be permissive
intervenors, a central question concerns how much in common the outsider nonparty must have with the main action to become a full party to the litigation.
Likewise, we must know how much delay or prejudice to existing parties is too
much. The discussion that follows takes up these inquiries.
Intervention of Right
Although there is consensus that intervention of right is a relatively limited
procedural option, courts diverge in assessing how much interest the proposed
intervenor must have “in the property or transaction that is the subject matter of
the action.15 The basic rule is clear that the interest’s sufficiency must be
15

For discussion of the circuit split regarding the need for intervenors to establish independent
Article III standing, see infra at xx. Also oft-debated regarding intervention of right is the
“adequate representation” inquiry, which can lead a court to deny intervention even if the movant
has a sufficient interest in the litigation. See, e.g., Prete v. Bradbury, 483 F.3d 949, 955-56, 957-59
(9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting intervention where sponsors of an Oregon ballot measure had a
protectable interest but were adequately represented by the government defendant). On the one
hand, when the government is a party, it is frequently treated as providing adequate representation
if the intervention applicant and government party seek the same ultimate objective. See, e.g.,
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297 (9 th Cir. 1997) (sustaining
denial of intervention where the court found that the group that had drafted and sponsored initiative
was adequately represented by the state defendant); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186 n.7
(7th Cir. 1982). On the other, it is “not uncommon” for courts to depart from the assumption that
government representation is adequate in cases where “government regulations are challenged and
private parties who benefit from such regulations seek to intervene as defendants.” United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 457 (W.D.N.Y.) , aff'd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1984). The leading case in the area is Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528,
538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636 n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972)), which held that “The requirement of
[Rule 24(a)(2) ] is satisfied if the applicant shows that the representation of his interest ‘may be’
inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal.” Id. at 538 n. 10,
92 S.Ct. 630. See also Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 170 F.R.D. 435 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (holding that “applicants do not need to show, to a certainty, that the City will not fully
protect their interests; rather, they need only show that the City might fail to do so”).
In the kinds of cases at issue here, where a non-state actor seeks intervention to defend a
measure passed by voter initiative, the adequate-representation inquiry should not to pose much of
a barrier because initiative promoters arguably bring a different quality of enthusiasm and expertise
to the litigation. The inadequacy of government representation is even clearer, of course, where the
government defendant opposes the challenged measure.
In addition to the divergence among circuits discussed in the text, circuits have also split
over whether an intervenor as of right must have standing independent of the original parties to the
suit. Compare San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir.2005) (holding
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determined functionally rather than formally.16 But what this flexible approach
means for the required interest’s breadth is not entirely clear, and circuits have
split over how best to make that determination. The Supreme Court’s most recent
extended engagement with FRCP 24(a) “recognized that certain public concerns
may constitute an adequate ‘interest’” and that a “’significantly protectable
interest’” is what is required.17 Commentators and lower courts, however, have
suggested that the Court’s rulings do not provide much help.18 As Judge Bazelon
observed some years earlier, “The effort to extract substance from the conclusory
phrase ‘interest’ or ‘legally protectable interest’ is of limited promise.”19 As a
result, “the circuit courts of appeals have struggled to reach a definitive
interpretation” of the rule,20 and “[c]ourts have adopted a variety of approaches
and a wide range of terminology in discussing the issue of interest.”21
that Article III standing is not necessary for intervention); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th
Cir. 1998); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.1994) (same);
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991) (same); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197,
1213 (11th Cir.1989) (same); and United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d
Cir.1978) (same); with Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that Article
III standing is required for intervention), and United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855,
859 (7th Cir.1985) See Jones v. Prince George's County, 348 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C.Cir.2003);
South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir.2003) (same); Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.1996) (same).
16
The original rule required intervenors to be legally bound by the original litigation’s result,
while the post-1966 version, still in place today asks whether the existing litigation would impair
the outsider’s interest “as a practical matter.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). This increased flexibility was aimed
deliberately to “expand the circumstances in which intervention of right would be appropriate.” San
Juan Cty v. US, 503 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing rule revisions).
17
Diamond v. Charles, (discussing Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129, 135 (1967) and Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)). Concurring in
Diamond v. Charles, Justice O’Connor added that “[c]learly, Donaldson's requirement of a
“significantly protectable interest” calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some
degree of legal protection.” (citations omitted) Diamond at 75. See also Advisory Committee's
Notes on Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 567.
18

See, e.g., 7C Wright et al., supra, § 1908, at 263 (There is not as yet any clear definition, either
from the Supreme Court or from the lower courts, of the nature of the “interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action” that is required for intervention of right.)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)); San Juan Cty, at xx (“The Supreme Court has directly addressed the
impaired-interest requirement on only two occasions [Cascade Natural Gas Corp. and Donaldson].
Neither opinion is much help. One contains merely a bare holding, with essentially no explanation.
The other explains its holding but it is unclear how much it relies on Rule 24.”).
19

Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C.Cir.1969) (Bazelon, C.J., plurality opinion).
7C Wright et al., supra, § 1908, at 270 . Circuit courts vary, too, in the standard of review they
apply to district court rulings on intervention motions. On motions to intervene as of right,
appellate review ranges from abuse of discretion in the First Circuit, see, e.g., International Paper
Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Jay, Me., 887 F.2d 338, 343-44 (1st Cir. 1989) to de novo in the Fifth
Circuit, see, e.g., City of Houston v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc., 668 F.3d 291, 293 (5 th Cir.
20

8

2012) (citation omitted). See also Fund for Animals v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 733 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (comparing Smoke, 252 F.3d at 470-71 (stating that the court reviews denials of
intervention as of right for clear error), and Foster, 655 F.2d at 1324 (same), with Mova
Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1074 (explaining that “[t]o the extent that a district court's ruling on a motion
to intervene as of right is based on questions of law, it is reviewed de novo; to the extent that it is
based on questions of fact, it is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion”), and Building &
Constr. Trades, 40 F.3d at 1282 (stating that denials are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard). For permissive intervention, by contrast, the standard is settled at abuse of discretion.
See Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944) (denial of Rule
24(b) permissive intervention is within the district court’s discretion and is reviewable only where
clear abuse of discretion has been shown).
21

6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03 [2][a], at 24-30 (3d ed. 2006). For
example, the Second Circuit barred a utility company form intervening in a citizen’s suit seeking
Environmental Protection Agency review of air quality standards because the company’s interest
was “too remote and therefore insufficient”). See also American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d
258, 261 (2d Cir. 1992) (interest of utility companies in citizens' suit seeking review by EPA of air
quality standards was too remote and, therefore, insufficient). Similarly, Trans Chem. Ltd. v.
China Nat'l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 332 F.3d 815, 823-824 (5th Cir. 2003) (applicants for
intervention did not have "direct and substantial" interest in suit to enforce arbitration award when
they sought intervention to litigate whether they were owners of plaintiff corporation). For
additional discussion of interests sufficient to justify intervention of right, see, e.g.,
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina ( In re Sierra Club), 945 F.2d 776, 779 (4th
Cir.1991) (holding that an environmental organization that was party to an administrative
permitting proceeding was entitled to intervene of right in an action challenging the
constitutionality of a state regulation); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 527-28 (holding that
wildlife organizations were entitled to intervene of right in an action procedurally challenging the
Department of the Interior’s decision to establish a conservation area); Washington State Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 684 F.2d at 630 (holding that “the public interest group that sponsored the
[statute as a ballot] initiative ... was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)” in
an action challenging the constitutionality of the statute); Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 735 (same); Planned
Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th Cir.1977) (holding that a
neighborhood association, whose “professed purpose ... is to preserve property values and insure
that abortion facilities do not affect the health, welfare and safety of citizens,” was entitled to
intervene in an action challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance imposing a moratorium
on the construction of abortion clinics); New York Public Interest Research Group v. Regents of the
Univ., 516 F.2d 350, 351-52 (2d Cir.1975) (holding that a pharmacists' organization and individual
pharmacists had a right to intervene in an action brought by consumers to challenge a state
regulation prohibiting the advertising of the price of prescription drugs); Coalition of Arizona/New
Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. Department of Interior, 100 F.3d 837 (10 th Cir.
1996) (holding that a prospective intervenor's interest in Mexican spotted owl, as photographer,
amateur biologist, and naturalist who had been at forefront of efforts to protect owl under
Endangered Species Act (ESA), was direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest, for
purposes of intervention as of right in county coalition's action challenging Fish and Wildlife
Service's (FWS) decision to protect owl under Act. )
Cases denying intervention of right also offer insight into the scope of the “interest”
requirement. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that lobby
organization in Illinois legislature did not have protectable interest in lawsuit regarding
constitutionality of law regulating abortion because the only entities with sufficient interest were
governmental bodies required to defend and enforce law of state); United States v. 36.96 Acres of

9

For intervenors seeking to defend a ballot measure and lawmakers seeking
to defend legislation that they support, an additional challenge lies in showing that
the interest, however defined, is at risk of impairment by the ongoing litigation.
Because ballot measures do not typically create property or other cognizable rights
for their proponents, and because legislation does not typically create rights
particular to legislators, it is not clear how proponents or legislators in those
contexts can claim any sort of cognizable interest, much less a “significant
protectable interest.” After all, to take the case of Proposition 8, it is difficult to
see how the measure, which restricts the marriage rights of same-sex couples,
could impair, practically or otherwise, a protectable interest of its official
proponents where none of the individuals identifies as gay or as seeking to marry a
same-sex partner, and the sponsoring not-for-profit organization does not claim to
include individuals seeking to marry a same-sex partner in its membership.22 The
same is true for BLAG and its effort to defend DOMA.
Still, numerous courts have found that initiative proponents do have the
requisite interest for intervention as right. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded, in
a case involving an English-only initiative, that “[t] here appears to be a virtual per
se rule that the sponsors of a ballot initiative have a sufficient interest in the
subject matter of the litigation to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a).”23 On
its view, because “Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal construction . . . the
public interest group that sponsored the initiative [is] entitled to intervention as a
matter of right under Rule 24(a).”24
But the special ballot-sponsor intervention rule has never been as
categorical as the Ninth Circuit suggests. In particular, the Sixth Circuit warned
Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858-60 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that lobby organization attempting to foster
national legislation did not have right to intervene; only government had a protectable interest in
condemnation action between sovereign and private party); Resort Timeshare Resales, Inc. v.
Stuart, 764 F.Supp. 1495, 1499 (S.D.Fla.1991) (holding that lobbyist was not entitled to intervene
when asserted interest in law was too nebulous to create “real party in interest” in litigation
challenging constitutionality of state statute requiring timeshare sellers to obtain real estate
licenses).
22

The initiative proponents whose cert petition was granted in Perry v. Brown include Dennis
Hollingsworth, Gail J. Knight, Martin F. Gutierrez, Mark A. Jansson, and ProtectMarriage.com –
Yes on 8, a Project of California Renewal. [cite and discussion of the proponent who removed
himself from the case to come]
23
Yniguez v Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
24

Id. See also See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1251-1253 (10th Cir. 2001)
(environmental groups had sufficient interest in national monument to intervene in suit seeking to
have creation of monument declared illegal); Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable
Economic Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840-844 (10th Cir. 1996) (wildlife
photographer had sufficient interest to intervene in suit to protect Mexican Spotted Owl).
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that “[w]ithout [] limitations of the legal interest required for intervention, Rule 24
would be abused as a mechanism for the over-politicization of the judicial
process.”25 It reasoned that while public interest organizations, including ballot
measure sponsors, have a sufficient interest in the initiative process, only those
“regulated by the new law, or, similarly, whose members are affected by the law,
may likely have an ongoing legal interest in its enforcement after it is enacted.”26
Any others can have “only a generic interest shared by the entire . . . citizenry,”
and an “interest so generalized will not support a claim for intervention as of
right).27
Consistent with this view, far fewer courts have accepted intervention by
subgroups of lawmakers, as will be discussed at greater length infra. Yet for
BLAG, as also discussed below, intervention has come easily.28
The latter part of this Essay will theorize about the reasons for this
divergence between Rule 24(a) jurisprudence and its application in Perry and the
DOMA cases; for purposes here, the point is simply that, notwithstanding the raft
of judicial decisions allowing intervention of right to Proposition 8’s proponents
and BLAG, it is not obvious that either can claim the interest required of those
who seek to intervene as of right.
Permissive Intervention
Perhaps permissive intervention is a better fit for ballot measure sponsors?
Recall that permissive intervention’s chief requirements are that the moving party
have a claim or defense involving a question of fact or law that is common to the
original action and that the intervention not unduly delay or prejudice the existing
litigants. As the Supreme Court has explained, F.R.C.P. 24(b) "plainly dispenses
with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary

25

Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm (at 783- but quoting something else).
Similar, the Seventh Circuit observed that there is no special public interest rule. [check – not sure
this is actually in the op] BUT - No special public interest rule. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265,
1268-1269 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Moore's, intervention of right denied to pro-life public interest
group seeking to challenge abortion legislation).
26
In Granholm (quoting .” Id. at 345; accord, e.g., Grutter, 188 F.3d at 401 (holding that proposed
intervenors, who were applicants to the University of Michigan, had a substantial legal interest in
the school's admissions process); Miller, 103 F.3d at 1247 (holding that the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce had a substantial legal interest where it was regulated by at least three of the four
statutory provisions challenged by plaintiffs).
27
Granholm, citing/quoting: .” Miller, 103 F.3d at 1246 (quoting and citing with approval Athens
Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir.1982)
28
See infra.
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interest in the subject of the litigation.”29 Moreover, courts have made clear that
permissive intervention can be granted where an applicant presents the same legal
claim or defense as an existing party, even when its claims arise from different
factual circumstances.”30
Because permissive intervention encompasses so many would-be litigants
who have only a minimal connection to the ongoing lawsuit, district courts have
significant discretion31 to gauge the costs and benefits associated with allowing
them in.32 With some frequency, district courts allow permissive intervention by
public interest organizations with long-standing interest and expertise in the issues
before the court.33 But again, questions about the value and burdens associated
29

SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459, 60 S. Ct. 1044, 1055, 84
L.Ed. 1293, 1306 (1940). See also Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108-1111 (9th
Cir. 2002) (district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention to
environmental group seeking to support of U.S. Forest Service rule, even though applicants had no
"significant protectable interest" in subject matter of suit).
30
See, e.g., McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 250-251 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(granting low-income tenants' motion to intervene permissively because applicants presented
identical legal claims to those of tenant plaintiffs despite fact that circumstances of intervenors'
claims were different from those of original plaintiffs ).
31
See, e.g., South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. United States Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 787-788
(8th Cir. 2003) ("Reversal of a decision denying permissive intervention is extremely rare,
bordering on nonexistent"); Rosenshein v. Kleban, 918 F. Supp. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(observing that the district court possesses "broad discretion in resolving applications for
permissive intervention"); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 6, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(district court's discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) is broad). On appellate review of
intervention motions generally, see supra note xx.
32
See, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977)
(considering additional factors in exercising discretion, including “the nature and extent of the
intervenors' interest” and “whether the intervenors' interests are adequately represented by other
parties”).
33
See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 340 F. Supp. 400,
408-409 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) , rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972) (granting
permissive intervention to Audubon Society in environmental dispute involving strip-mining and
asserts that "Audubon demonstrates a long-standing interest in and familiarity with strip-mining,
expertise that may be helpful in clarifying the facts and issues"); General Motors Corp. v. Burns,
50 F.R.D. 401, 405 (D. Haw. 1970) (allowing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) intervention and noting
Hawaii's statement that intervenor "and its members have unique knowledge of the Hawaii
automobile industry and ... similar statutes in other jurisdictions" that will help "to fully present to
the Court all of the facts in this case"); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1538-1539 (N.D.
Fla. 1995) (granting permissive intervention to the NAACP in a redistricting dispute, reasoning that
the NAACP’s participation would aid the court in its constitutional inquiry and would bring a
"unique perspective," and noting that the organization had been allowed to intervene in similar
actions around the country). Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185,
189 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting county’s permissive intervention motion in a Voting Rights Act case
because its input would not significantly help develop relevant factual issues).
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with the intervention loom large.34 Consequently, when courts believe that a
potential intervenor will essentially repeat the same sort of evidence that existing
parties will present, they typically characterize intervention as counterproductive
and as something that will unnecessarily prolong the litigation.35 But again, even
absent redundancy, the rule’s plain text requires that the intervening party have a
claim or a defense; nothing in the rule indicates that the intervenor can appear to
assert interests it does not possess.
Although adequacy of representation is not formally part of the permissive
intervention rule as it is for intervention as of right, courts often consider it as part
of this calculus when deciding whether to grant a permissive intervention
request.36 Likewise, if one of the existing parties is the government and that party
34

Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 343-346 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that denial of permissive intervention should not be reversed without clear abuse of discretion, and
such abuse was not shown when district court had addressed relevant criteria, including delay and
prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)); 1st Circuit Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics
& Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in case challenging campaign
financing legislation, that relevant factor justifying rejection of intervenors was the need to
expedite resolution of case). Cf. H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., 797 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.
1986) (finding no abuse of discretion where state was not allowed to intervene in a private antitrust
action because, in addition to the potential for undue delay, the state failed to demonstrate that its
intervention would assist in the "just and equitable adjudication of any of the issues between the
parties").
35
See South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S.Ct. 854, 875 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (“’Where he presents no new questions, a third party can contribute usually most
effectively and always most expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by
intervention.’”)(citation omitted). See also Getty Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 865 F.2d 270,
277 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that when non-party presented no new questions,
intervention should be denied and amicus curiae brief would be more efficient); Arney v. Finney,
967 F.2d 418, 421-422 (10th Cir. 1992) (sustaining denial of intervention because applicant's
intervention would not aid class of prison inmates in its attempt to correct allegedly
unconstitutional conditions); NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 159 F.R.D. 505, 508 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
(denying intervention to an association of insurance agents that sought to intervene and defend suit
by banks against state insurance commissioner and reasoning that intervenor raised no new
defenses).
36
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 834
F.2d 60, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that the fact that intervenor's claimed interest was
economic and existing defendants' interest was governmental did not establish inadequate
representation in citizens' suit under Clean Air Act). Cf. Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy,
Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 101 F.R.D. 497, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing adequacy of
representation of intervenors' interest by existing parties is "minor factor at most" in determining
motions for intervention) (citation omitted); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Pipe Line Co.,
732 F.2d 452, 472 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that whether intervenors' interests are adequately
represented by other parties is proper factor to consider in acting on request for permissive
intervention); South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. United States Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 787788 (8th Cir. 2003) (observing that whether existing parties will adequately protect proposed
intervenor's interests is a minor variable, but it is legitimate consideration, and that district court did
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is aggressively seeking the same outcome as the proposed intervenor, courts are
often unwilling to grant permissive intervention.37
Intervention Rules as Applied: Perry v. Brown
Perry is a particularly interesting case for exploring the application of this
intervention jurisprudence in part because the district court granted only two
intervention motions from a much broader array. Most significantly for purposes
here, the district court found that Proposition 8’s sponsors could intervene as of
right under FRCP 24(a), concluding, without explanation, that they had a
“significant protectible interest in defending Proposition 8’s constitutionality” and
that that interest would be affected directly by the lawsuit.38 The court found as
well that their interest “was not represented by another party” because the
Attorney General, who was charged with enforcing the measure, had indicated his
view that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.39 The district court also granted the
City of San Francisco’s motion to intervene permissively because the City had
claimed its financial interest would be adversely affected by Proposition 8. The
court made clear that this factor, rather than the City’s ability to contribute
generally to the factual record, led it to permit intervention. Based on that
analysis, the court limited the City’s participation in the case to issues related to its
financial interest.40 Proposition 8’s promoters faced no similar limitation.

not abuse its discretion when it denied intervention primarily because it found that proposed
intervenor's interests were adequately protected by U.S. Government); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d
418, 421 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the fact that applicant's interests were adequately
represented by class representatives meant applicant had no right to intervene, and was also
relevant factor in denial of permissive intervention); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d 418, 421-422 (10th
Cir. 1992) (upholding denial of applicant's motion to intervene as class representative in action
challenging prison conditions because other class representatives adequately represented interests
of class, including applicant)).
37
See, e.g., Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 164 F.R.D. 672, 678 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
(denying permissive intervention request of paper trade association and paper manufacturers and
asserting that "[w]hen intervention of right is denied for the proposed intervenor's failure to
overcome the presumption of adequate representation by the government, the case for permissive
intervention disappears").
38
Order at 3, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 76). Because it
granted the proponents’ Rule 24(a) motion, the court did not address the motion for permissive
intervention.
39

Id.

40

Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 162) (“[I]t seems to the Court that what distinguishes San Francisco as an intervenor,
especially from the others seeking intervention, that is San Francisco claims a governmental
interest that no other party, including the Governor and the Attorney General of California, has
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At the same time, the court rejected intervention motions by organizations
representing same-sex couples and by an organization opposed to marriage rights
for same-sex couples. Regarding intervention of right, it found that the
organizations representing couples had advanced a sufficient interest but were
adequately represented by the existing plaintiffs, and that the proposed defendantintervenor did not have the requisite interest and, even if it did, it was already
adequately represented.41 With respect to permissive intervention, the court held
that “the participation of these additional parties would add very little, if anything,
to the actual record, but in all probability would consume additional time and
resources of both the Court and the parties that have a direct stake in the outcome
of these proceedings.”42 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both rulings, consistent with
its Circuit’s settled recognition of initiative-sponsors as parties.43
In short, intervention rules operated to filter out many would-be intervenors
from the litigation, including those with cognizable injuries as a result of
Proposition 8. But they did not serve a gatekeeping role with respect to
Proposition 8’s official sponsors and instead endowed those sponsors with full
status as defendants.
Intervention Rules as Applied II – BLAG and the DOMA cases
The ease with which BLAG intervened in to defend DOMA in multiple
federal courts is notable as well. BLAG, a 5-person body comprised of House

asserted. Because of this interest, it appears that San Francisco has an independent interest in the
proceedings, and the ability to contribute to the development of the underlying issues without
materially delaying the proceedings.”).
41
Id. at xx.
42
Id. at 53.
43
The organization opposing marriage rights for same-sex couples, The Campaign for California
Families, appealed the denial of its interventions motions to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the
district court’s ruling. Regarding the motion to intervene as of right, the court wrote:
The reality is that the Campaign and those advocating the constitutionality of Prop. 8
have identical interests-that is, to uphold Prop. 8. Any differences are rooted in style and
degree, not the ultimate bottom line. Divergence of tactics and litigation strategy is not
tantamount to divergence over the ultimate objective of the suit. Because the existing
parties will adequately represent the Campaign's interests, we affirm the district court's
denial of intervention as of right.
Perry v. Brown, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9 th Cir. 2009). Regarding permissive intervention, the court
added that ”[i]t was well within the district court's discretion to find that the delay occasioned by
intervention outweighed the value added by the Campaign's participation in the suit.” Id. at 956.
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majority and minority leaders,44 filed intervention motions in numerous DOMA
actions after the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it would no longer
defend the statute.45 Most of these motions were unopposed;46 all have been
granted.47

44

Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, Section 670, Rule II.8 (“The Office of
General Counsel shall function pursuant to the direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which shall include the majority and minority leaderships.”).
45

See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Representative John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (announcing and explaining DOJ’s
decision not to defend DOMA). The Attorney General is required to notify the House leadership
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) of its decision “to refrain (on the grounds that the
provision is unconstitutional) from defending . . . the constitutionality of any provision of any
Federal statute.”
The House Speaker responded by convening BLAG and indicating that BLAG would
intervene to defend DOMA. See Press Release, Representative John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives, House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality Is Determined by the Court
(Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://
johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=228585.
BLAG’s two minority members opposed the decision to intervene. See Representative
Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Letter to Speaker Boehner on House Counsel Defense of DOMA (Mar. 11,
2011), available at http:// pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2011/03/pelosi-letter-to-speakerboehner-on-house-counsel-defense-of-doma.shtml.
46
Plaintiffs in suits challenging DOMA did not generally oppose BLAG’s motions to intervene.
See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgt., 824 F.Supp.2d 968, 977 (N.D. 2012); Windsor
v. United States, 797 F. Supp.2d 320, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Neither the plaintiff nor the DOJ
opposes BLAG’s intervention”). But see Revelis v. Napolitano, 844 F.Supp.2d 915, 924 (N.D.Ill.
2012) (“Plaintiff opposes BLAG’s motion to intervene, arguing that it should be limited to amicus
curiae status.”). In several cases, the DOJ sought to limit BLAG’s involvement to making
substantive arguments in DOMA’s defense. The court in Windsor rejected that argument, see
Windsor at 323-25, but the district court in Revelis appeared to accept it. Revelis at 924, 925
(acknowledging DOJ’s request that BLAG be “limited to making substantive arguments in support
of DOMA, while they continue to file all procedural notices” and holding that “BLAG may
intervene for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of DOMA”).
47

See Blesch v. Holder, 2012 Westlaw 1965401 *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012) (“Each of the 10
federal courts to consider the issue has permitted the House to intervene. See Torres–Barragan v.
Holder, No. 10–55768 (9th Cir. April 10, 2012) (ECF No. 56); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of
HHS, Nos. 10–2204, 10–2207, 10–2214 (1st Cir. June 16, 2011) (ECF No. 5558549); Revelis v.
Napolitano, No. 11–cv01991 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 5, 2012) (ECF No. 33); Cozen O'Connor, P.C. v.
Tobits, No. 11–cv–00045 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 16, 2011) (ECF No. 82); Bishop v. United States, No. 04–
cv–00848 (N.D.Okla. Aug. 5, 2011) (ECF No. 181); Lui v. Holder, 11–cv–01267 (C.D.Cal. July
13, 2011) (ECF No. 25); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 10–cv–1564 (N.D. Cal. June
10, 2011) (ECF No. 88); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10–cv–0257 (N.D. Cal. June 3,
2011) (ECF No. 116); Windsor v. United States, 10–cv–08435, 797 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. June
2, 2011); Pederson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 10–cv–01750 (D.Conn. May 27, 2011) (ECF No.
55).”). For web-accessible versions of some of these opinions, see Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the
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Only two opinions gave the intervention motion extended consideration
and both found that BLAG had the requisite interest level for intervention of right.
In Windsor, the magistrate concluded that “BLAG has a cognizable interest in
defending the enforceability of statutes the House has passed when the President
declines to enforce them.”48 And in Revelis, the court found that BLAG’s interests
exceeded those of an “ordinary taxpayer” because “[t]he House has an interest in
defending the constitutionality of legislation which it passed when the executive
branch declines to do so.”49
The essay’s next part shows through Article III case law, why individual
representatives and subgroups of legislators, such as BLAG, do not actually have
more of a particularized interest than voters or taxpayers in enforcing the statutes
they participating in passing.50 Here, it simply bears noting that although some
courts have treated BLAG as though it were the House of Representatives,51 it is
Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass.
2010).]
48
Windsor, 797 F.Supp.2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
49
Revelis, 844 F.Supp.2d at 924-25.
50

Although BLAG’s submissions supporting intervention have cited to cases involving
intervention by the House, Daniel Meltzer observed that “some of these cases . . . involved
executive-legislative disagreements about the separation of powers, and in none of them did the
congressional intervenor appear actually to have engaged in full-scale litigation in the district court,
as distinguished from having defended the statute in connection with a motion for a preliminary
injunction, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary judgment on a
very limited record, such as affidavits.” Daniel Meltzer, 61 Duke L. Rev. 1183, 1210 n.133 (2012).
51

In Revelis, the court deemed “unpersuasive” the plaintiff’s contention “that BLAG does not
represent Congress as a whole.” Revelis, 844 F.Supp.2d at 925. It wrote “BLAG, a five-member
bipartisan group, is the mechanism through which the House presents its position in litigation, and
courts have allowed it to intervene in cases where appropriate.” Id. The court cited two cases in
support. One, In re Matter of Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358, 1360 (5th Cir. 1986), contained no analysis
of the intervention motion. The other, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 23, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. by Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), does not appear to
strengthen BLAG’s position for two reasons. First, that case involved legislators’ objection to the
President’s handling of a bill that, they argued, had nullified their votes. Recognizing an interest
like this would conceivably be consistent with extant doctrine finding that legislators have a
cognizable interest in the legislative process being a fair one. See infra at n. xx But interest in fair
process does not translate to a cognizable interest for individuals or subgroups of legislators in
enforcing legislation once it has passed. And second, although the Supreme Court did not address
the question of intervenors’ interests because it vacated the decision below on mootness grounds,
Justice Stevens’ dissent on the mootness point, underscored that the Court had not found the
representatives to have sufficient interest in pursuing the action on their own behalf. See id. at 366
(“There is, of course, a serious question whether the Senate of the United States and a group of 33
Congressmen have standing to enforce those duties [created by the challenged law] in this
litigation.”).
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not. According to the House rules, BLAG can direct the House Office of the
General Counsel to file amicus briefs” in cases involving the House’s interests”
but must “call for legislation or a House resolution” to “authorize[e] the General
Counsel to represent the House itself.”52 There is no such resolution regarding
DOMA.53 Indeed, two of BLAG’s five members opposed the use of House
resources to defend DOMA,54 and 133 members of the House filed an amicus
curiae brief in the First Circuit maintaining that DOMA is unconstitutional.55
Congress also has not authorized BLAG to represent the federal governments
interests.56 The easy equation that some have made between BLAG and the House
of Representatives thus finds no support in the facts.
III.

The Article III Questions: Government’s Mantle and Injury in Fact

Our inquiry must continue because being granted intervenor status does not, of
itself, secure federal jurisdiction.57 Particularly where an intervenor is the only
52

See Martin O. James, Congressional Oversight 122 (2002) (“The office may appear as amicus
curiae on behalf of the Speaker and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in litigation involving the
institutional interests of the House. Where authorized by statute or resolution, the general counsel
may represent the House itself in judicial proceedings."). Indeed, 28 U.S.C. §530D, in requiring
the Attorney General to notify Congress if the Executive Branch declines to defend a law, specifies
that notification must be completed “within such time as will reasonable enable the House of
Representatives and the Senate to take action, separately or jointly, to intervene in timely fashion in
the proceeding.” Id. (emphasis added).
53
Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930 n.5 (1983) (noting that full House and Senate had
authorized intervention via resolution). For discussion of the ways in which the House might
authorize action, see Walker v. Cheney, 230 F.Supp.2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing cases
where "the relevant House of Congress had also passed a resolution expressly endorsing pursuit of
the lawsuit").
54
See supra note xx.
55
Amicus Br. Of Members of the House of Representatives, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Svcs., Hos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 3, 2011).
56

For more on this point, see Matthew Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law
Litigation, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 1576-78 (2012). There are additional important questions
regarding whether the House, or even the full Congress, can legitimately intervene to defend a
federal law. As the Court suggested in United States v. Providence Journal Col, 485 U.S. 693, 701
(1988), “[i]t seems to be elementary that even when exercising distinct and jealously separated
powers, the three branches are but ‘co-ordinate parts of one government.’” (citations omitted). See
also 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 517, 518, and 519 (providing that the Attorney General shall direct all
litigation in which the United States has interests).
57

See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor's right to continue a suit in
the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by
the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”) (citing Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher
Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 339 (1945); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 368 (1980)). As
David Shapiro explained,
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party to seek an appeal in federal court, it must have Article III standing just like
any other party.58
So, we arrive at our constitutional question: can a ballot initiative proponent or
elected officials who has survived the intervention hurdle also satisfy Article III’s
standing requirements for purposes of defending a challenged enactment. As
noted earlier, this question breaks into two – first, whether these actors can derive
their standing from the government, and second, whether they have their own
particularized interest that suffices to establish standing.
Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Governments – A Quick Primer on Standing
Typical discussions of Article III standing, which arise mainly regarding
plaintiffs,59 stress that parties seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must establish:
A distinction between standing to intervene and to appeal makes particular sense when the
“case or controversy” limitation on the federal judicial power is recalled. Adding C to the
litigation between A and B may pose no problems under Article III of the Constitution, but
permitting C to be the sole adversary of B on appeal, when his interest in the case may be only
in its value as precedent, certainly does give difficulty since there is no real controversy
between A and C.
David Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
Harv.L.Rev. 721, 753-54 (1968).
58

See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (“Standing to sue or defend is
an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54, 56 (1986) (same regarding standing to defend). The Court has acknowledged that if existing
parties have Article III standing, additional parties need not necessarily satisfy standing
requirements themselves. See Diamond at 64 (“Had the State sought review, this Court's Rule 10.4
makes clear that Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to seek
review, enabling him to file a brief on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this ability
to ride “piggyback” on the State's undoubted standing exists only if the State is in fact an appellant
before the Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no case for Diamond to
join.”); cf. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981) (finding that it was not
necessary to decide standing of other plaintiffs because one plaintiff was found to have standing);
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n. 9 (1977) (same).
Indeed, the circuits have split over whether proposed intervenors must establish Article III
standing in addition to satisfying Rule 24’s requirements. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68
(“[T]he precise relationship between the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest
required to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals”) (citing
divergent circuit court cases); id. at 68-69 (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to
intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also
the requirements of Art. III.”); McConnell v FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (plurality op.), rev’d on
other grounds by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that
because existing defendant has standing, “we need not address the standing of the intervenordefendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's”) (citations omitted).
59

See supra text at xx.
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“(1) an injury in fact (i.e. a “concrete and particularized” invasion of a “legally
protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e. a ‘’fairly . . . trace[able]’” connection
between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and
(3) redressability (i.e., it is ‘”likely”’ and not ‘merely “speculative”’ that the
plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit.”60
While some of these concerns are particular to plaintiffs, the Court has
reinforced that, even for defendant-intervenors, having a “’direct stake in the
outcome’” remains critical.61 The Court has insisted, further, that federal litigation
“is not to be placed in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders’ who will use it simply
as a ‘vehicle for the vindication of value interests.’”62
Separately, the Court has made clear that governments have standing to defend
their own laws, including via intervention. Indeed, perhaps because the point
seems so obvious, there is relatively little discussion of it in the case law. As the
Supreme Court explained matter-of-factly in Maine v. Taylor, “a State clearly has
a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes.”63 For this
reason, the Court permitted Maine to obtain Supreme Court review of a federal
prosecution that had led a circuit court to invalidate a state law, even though the
60

Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Svcs, 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008) (quoting Lujan at
560-61). In addition, the Court has several prudential grounds for limiting standing. See Elk
Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (describing these grounds, which
include limitations on third-party standing, as “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction”). In the context of initiative proponents, third-party standing is not at issue.
Instead, the alternate claims are that the initiative proponents are functioning as the government’s
authorized representatives or that the proponents’ own interests have been infringed in ways that
justify federal jurisdiction.
In all instances, the party that seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden to
establish standing. For cases making this point in the context of plaintiffs seeking review, see, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[W]hether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or
controversy’ between himself and the defendant is the threshold question in every federal case,
determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 335 (2006) (reiterating that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim [s]he
seeks to press”). For discussion of intervenor’s burden to establish standing to pursue an appeal,
see infra at xx.
61
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63 (1986) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1972).
62
Id. (quoting U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
63

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986). See also Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 848
F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1988) (same). Not surprisingly, there are few cases that make this
observation explicitly. In nearly all cases, the point that states have standing to defend their own
laws is taken as obvious for the reasons discussed supra at xx.
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federal government had declined to pursue its own appeal.64 Likewise, in rejecting
a private actor’s effort to defend a state law in Diamond v. Charles, the Court
observed that “[b]ecause the State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the
State has the kind of ‘direct stake’ identified in Sierra Club [] in defending the
standards embodied in that code.”65 Federal statutory law also reflects the
importance of the state’s interest in defending its own laws, authorizing states to
intervene in federal litigation whenever “the constitutionality of any statute of that
State affecting the public interest is drawn in question.”66
The Limits of Formal Delegation
If only formal conferral was necessary for governments to confer Article III
standing to others, the questions on which this Essay focuses could be resolved
simply. Although issues particular to the putative delegations to Proposition 8’s
proponents in Perry or to BLAG in Windsor and the other DOMA cases would
remain,67 there would be little need for extended discussion here.
But statutory conferral of standing, in itself, is not sufficient to satisfy Article
III. Indeed, it is “settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing
64

The case arose from the federal government’s prosecution of a bait-seller under a federal statute
that made it a crime to import fish or wildlife in violation of state law. Maine intervened, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2403(b), which authorizes states to intervene in federal proceedings where the
constitutionality of state laws is challenged. After the First Circuit invalidated the Maine bait law
that underlay the prosecution, the federal government noticed an appeal to the Supreme Court but
then dismissed its appeal voluntarily. Maine, 477 U.S. at 137 n.5.
65
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. at 65. See also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (explaining that creation and enforcement of a civil and criminal
code is an “easily identified” sovereign interest).
66

28 U.S.C. §2403(b). The statute provides in full:
In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any
agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any
statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify
such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for
presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument
on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of
law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs
to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the
question of constitutionality.

Id.
67

See infra at xx.
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requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not
otherwise have standing.”68
This is not to say that jurisdictional conferrals are entirely unimportant.
Indeed, the Court has indicated that, at the federal level, they can “eliminate[] any
prudential standing limitations and significantly lessen[] the risk of unwanted
conflict with the Legislative Branch when that plaintiff brings suit.”69 At the state
level too, they seem to provide some assurance related to standing, or, perhaps
more accurately, their absence is noteworthy. In considering initiative proponents’
standing to defend Arizonan’s official-English rule, for example, the Court noted
pointedly that it was” aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as
agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”70 And in a case involving a
New Jersey minute-of-silence law, the Court, in recognizing Article III standing,
deemed it important that “state law authorize[d] legislators to represent the State's
interests.”71
Indeed, presumably it was in response to the Court’s Arizonans ruling that the
Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to determine whether
Proposition 8’s proponents had authorization to stand in the government’s stead. 72
68

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 100(1979)). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org, 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1972)
(“The plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury
shared by a large class of other possible litigants.’”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 501).
In the 2011 term, the Court dismissed as improvidently granted a case raising the question
whether Article III jurisdiction arises in circumstances where the plaintiff would not have to
establish an actual financial injury to prevail in obtaining statutory damages. See First American
Financial Corp., 610 F.3d 514 (2011) (granting Article III standing for damages under the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act where plaintiff did not have to show actual financial injury), cert
dismissed as improvidently granted by First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S.Ct. 2536
(2012).
69
Raines at 820 n.3. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930, n. 5, 939-940 (1983) (holding
Congress a proper party to defend a statute’s validity where both Houses, by resolution, had
authorized intervention in the lawsuit).
70

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987)
72
The proponents had “claim[e]d to assert the interest of the People of California in the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, which the People themselves enacted.” Perry at 1072. In
situating its analysis of the proponents’ standing, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Arizonans
case, citing the Supreme Court’s “‘grave doubts’ about the sponsors' standing” because there had
been no legislative authorization. Id. (citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65-66).
The Ninth Circuit had certified this question to the California Supreme Court:
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under
California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a
particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest
71
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The California court held that they did.73 BLAG, by contrast, does not have
formal authorization from the House of Representatives74 although no court to date
has deemed that absence significant.
The Government-Mantle Theory of Standing and the Legislature-as-a-Whole
Since formal authorization alone does not satisfy Article III, the next question
we must address is whether individuals and organizations that seek to defend
official enactments can derive their standing from the government’s standing to
defend its own laws. In theory, this could be accomplished either by the
government delegating its standing or by others taking up the government’s mantle
and stepping into legislative-defense role voluntarily in the government’s absence.
The discussion in the sections that follow will begin by considering the arguments
favoring these sorts of standing transfers. My ultimate argument, though, is that
the government-mantle theory, while conceivably viable for legislatures as a
whole, is neither doctrinally permissible nor normatively sensible for others.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has kept a tight constraint on government standins for Article III purposes, recognizing full legislatures, but few others, as
qualified federal court litigants. Although it has offered almost no explanation, the
Court seems to believe that the lawmaking body should be able to defend its work
if the executive branch does not. In the New Jersey minute-of-silence case, for
example, the Court allowed a circuit decision to stand where the state’s Attorney
General had declined to defend the law and the state General Assembly speaker
and Senate president had obtained authorization to intervene on the legislature’s

in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the
initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the
public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.
Perry, 631 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). Cf. id. at 1072 (“The State's highest court thus held that
California law provides precisely what the Arizonans Court found lacking in Arizona law: it
confers on the official proponents of an initiative the authority to assert the State's interests in
defending the constitutionality of that initiative, where the state officials who would ordinarily
assume that responsibility choose not to do so.”).
73

It wrote that “under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions
of the Elections Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative measure are authorized
to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity, enabling the proponents to defend the
constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative.” Perry v.
Brown, 52 Cal.4th 116, xx (2011). “[T]he role played by the proponents in such litigation,” the
court explained, “is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other
public officials in vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal
theories upon which a challenged provision may be sustained.” Id. at 525.
74
See supra at xx.
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behalf.75
Similarly, the Court has accepted that Congress, with proper authorization, can
step in to defend a statute, consistent with Article III, if the executive branch or
one of its agencies accepts the plaintiff’s contention that the challenged measure is
unconstitutional. In INS v. Chadha, the Court wrote, regarding Congress’s
intervention where the INS declined to defend an immigration statute, that “[w]e
have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute
when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute,
agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”76
Allowing the legislature as a whole to step into the government’s shoes for
Article III purposes is arguably consistent with governments’ standing to intervene
in defense of their own laws – any time a statute is challenged, the government’s
enforcement powers are at risk of diminishment. While the legislature does not
have its own enforcement powers, one could reasonably argue that the government
mantle can apply because its lawmaking responsibilities satisfy Article III’s “direct
stake” requirement.77

75

Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987). The Court wrote, simply, that “the New Jersey
Legislature had authority under state law to represent the State's interests in both the District Court
and the Court of Appeals.” Id. Describing the ruling later, the Court wrote that “[w]e have
recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute
unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State's interests.” Arizonans, 520
U.S. at 65. It is hard to know whether this broader characterization, which refers to “legislators”
rather than the legislature, was intentional, but given the absence of any acknowledgment or
explanation and the dissonance with other doctrine, it is unlikely that the Court in Arizonans
intended to expand Karcher’s reach.
76
462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983). Interestingly, neither of the two cases cited in support of this
proposition is actually on point. Instead, one of the cases, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S., at
210 n. 9, indicates in the cited footnote only that the Court had appointed a member of the Supreme
Court bar to present argument as amicus curiae defending the challenged law when the agency had
aligned itself with the petitioner. Id. (The entire footnote reads: Since the Immigration Service had
aligned itself with petitioner on this question, the Court invited William H. Dempsey, Jr., Esquire, a
member of the Bar of this Court, to appear and present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of
the judgment below). The other, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), does not discuss
standing at all.
Given that the Court reinforced the Congress-as-proper-party point in Arizonans, the
absence of meaningful precedential support in Chadha might not be as troubling as it seems. See
Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65n.20.
77

My tentative view is that this argument is not persuasive for reasons related to those the Court
gave in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) regarding the U.S. government’s
institutional design, see infra at xx, but fuller discussion of this point is beyond the scope here.
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Individual Legislators, Legislative Subgroups, and the Limits of the
Government-Mantle Theory
If a legislature can establish Article III standing to defend its enactments, then
why not individual legislators who supported, and perhaps even led the charge to
have a challenged measure enacted? Here, the Court has drawn a sharp line,
rejecting federal jurisdiction even for legislators who have statutory support for
their intervention, unless those legislators seek federal jurisdiction for a narrow set
of actions related to the voting process rather than outcomes.
This issue – and the contrast between full legislature’s and individual
legislators’ standing to invoke federal jurisdiction in constitutional litigation
regarding government enactments – arose most starkly in Raines v. Byrd, where
six members of Congress had statutory authorization to challenge the Line Item
Veto Act on constitutional grounds.78 To establish Article III standing, the
members argued that the veto law diminished their political power. The Court,
however, rejected the plaintiffs’ institutional injury assertion as “wholly abstract
and widely dispersed,” holding that “these individual members of Congress do not
have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently
concrete injury to have standing.” 79
78

521 U.S. 811 (1997). The Act provided that “[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual
adversely affected by [this Act] may bring an action, in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any
provision of this part violates the Constitution.” Id. at 815-16 (discussing § 692(a)(1)).
79
Id. at 830. See also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1986)
(holding that a school board member who “has no personal stake in the outcome of the litigation”
lacked standing); U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892) (“The two houses of Congress are legislative
bodies representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the
aggregate of the members who compose the body, and its action is not the action of any separate
members or number of members, but the action of the body as a whole.”). Cf. Nevada Comm. On
Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) (“’[T]he legislator casts his vote ‘as trustee for his
constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.’ In this respect, voting by a legislator is
different from voting by a citizen. While ‘a voter’s franchise is a personal right,’ ‘[t]he procedures
for voting in legislative assemblies . . . pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political
representatives executing the legislative process.’”) (internal citations omitted); Bond v. United
States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“compar[ing] Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 433–
436 (1998) (injured parties have standing to challenge Presidential line-item veto) with Raines v.
Byrd,521 U.S. 811, 829–83 (1997) (Congress Members do not).
Lower courts have also long concluded that an individual’s status as an elected official
does not itself confer Article III standing. See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190
(D.C.Cir.1973) (denying standing to a member of House of Representatives who sought a
declaratory judgment barring certain illegal activities by the Central Intelligence Agency);
Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding that members of House of
Representatives lacked standing to challenge funding expenditure for military action in Southeast
Asia); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1973) (holding that member of
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Similarly, the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge district court that found
no Article III standing where a senator sought to carry out “his special
[institutional] duties and responsibilities” and had statutory authorization to bring
suit in federal court.80 Noting that the decision to appoint Judge Mikva did not
diminish the effectiveness of the senator’s vote or otherwise injure his interests,
the district court concluded that individual members of Congress were “powerless
to procure” federal standing in this way, and that Congressional authorization to
file suit could not confer on them “a ‘right’ to seek a decision from a federal
court.”81
While individual legislators cannot claim the government’s mantle for
enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court has found that they can invoke federal
jurisdiction to protect the voting process and their own election. That is, their
roles enable them to establish a “direct stake” in the lawmaking process even if
they cannot claim that stake in the outcomes. For example, in Coleman v. Miller,
the Court found Article III standing for a group of legislators who challenged the
process by which the state legislature ratified a proposed U.S. constitutional
amendment regarding child labor.82 Still, exhibiting some sensitivity to having
House of Representatives lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment barring military action in
Cambodia). Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 512-514, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950-1951,
1959-1960, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (finding standing for a Member of Congress on the ground that
he suffered a concrete and personal injury when he was barred from taking his seat, and his salary,
in the House of Representatives).
80
McClure v. Carter, 513 F.Supp. 265, 270, 266 n.1 (D. Idaho 1981), aff’d sub nom McClure v.
Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
81
513 F.Supp. at 271 (D. Idaho 1981). Nor can former legislators take advantage of the
governmental-standing mantle. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81 (1987) (“Karcher and
Orechio participated in this lawsuit in their official capacities as presiding officers of the New
Jersey Legislature, but since they no longer hold those offices, they lack authority to pursue this
appeal on behalf of the legislature.”).
82
307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Raines v. Byrd, the Court discussed the procedural defects at issue in
Coleman at some length:
With the vote deadlocked 20 to 20, the amendment ordinarily would not have been ratified.
However, the State's Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the State Senate, cast a
deciding vote in favor of the amendment, and it was deemed ratified (after the State House of
Representatives voted to ratify it). The 20 State Senators who had voted against the
amendment, joined by a 21st State Senator and three State House Members, filed an action in
the Kansas Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus that would compel the appropriate
state officials to recognize that the legislature had not in fact ratified the amendment. That
court held that the members of the legislature had standing to bring their mandamus action, but
ruled against them on the merits.
This Court affirmed. By a vote of 5-4, we held that the members of the legislature had
standing. In explaining our holding, we repeatedly emphasized that if these legislators (who
were suing as a bloc) were correct on the merits, then their votes not to ratify the amendment
were deprived of all validity.
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allowed individual legislators to achieve Article III standing, even related to the
voting process, the Court later stressed that Coleman was “[t]he one case in which
we have upheld standing for legislators (albeit state legislators) claiming an
institutional injury.”83 To achieve Article III standing under Coleman, the Court
also suggested that legislators would have to “allege[] that they voted for a specific
bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was
nonetheless deemed defeated.”84
The other oft-cited case to support individual legislator standing, Powell v.
McCormack,85 is even more limited. There, Representative Adam Clayton Powell
succeeded in establishing Article III standing but only because he suffered an
individualized and concrete injury of the sort easily recognized by standard
doctrine when he was barred from taking his seat and salary in the House of
Representatives after having been duly elected.86
Whither BLAG?
As the case law just discussed makes plain, BLAG, as a subgroup of the House
of Representatives, or even as the official representative of the House,87 is not
well positioned to claim Article III standing to defend DOMA.88 The reason,
again, is that it cannot claim the government’s enforcement powers; nor can the
government’s decisions about enforcement strategy be said to present the sort of
Raines, 511 U.S. at 822 (footnote and citation omitted).
83
Raines, 521 U.S. 811, 821. The Court added: “It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman
stands (at most, see n. 8, infra ) for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action
goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely
nullified.” Id. at 822. See also Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas v.
Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that ten legislators lacked standing to seek
enforcement of abortion restrictions and describing Coleman as limiting legislator standing to cases
involving alleged “distortion of the legislative process” and not authorizing standing for legislators
who object on constitutional grounds to a properly enacted law).
84
Raines, 521 U.S. at 824.
85
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
86
Id. at 512-14 (1969).
87
There is no apparent support for BLAG having this representative status. See supra xx.
88
Unlike in Perry, where the intervenors’ inability to attain Article III standing requires dismissal,
see infra, there is a strong argument that the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to hear Windsor,
even without BLAG having its own Article III standing. The United States is subject to a court
order requiring reimbursement of taxes to Edie Windsor, the plaintiff-respondent. In addition, its
enforcement powers are diminished by DOMA’s invalidation, even if it is in agreement with that
determination. I do not address the Supreme Court’s related jurisdictional question in Windsor
regarding “[w]hether the Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is
unconstitutional deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case” as it discussion of it would
extend well beyond this essay’s scope.
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limited process-based challenges that have occasionally been permitted.89
Presumably for this reason, most of BLAG’s prior involvement in other federal
litigation has come in the form of amicus brief participation rather than through
intervention seeking full party status.90
Private Actors and the Government Mantle
The question remains whether private actors can claim the government’s
mantle, either with the government’s endorsement, as in Perry, or without.
Because Perry presents the strongest version of this claim that governments can
delegate their Article III standing, we will begin there and then consider the full
array of arguments that might support individuals and organizations stepping in
when government declines to defend a challenged law. As will be quickly
apparent, though, the doctrine leaves little room for private actors to establish the
interest and injury required by Article III in this context, and the theories that
might enable initiative proponents to stand out from among other private actors
would, if accepted, undermine Article III as a meaningful limitation on federal
jurisdiction.
In recognizing Article III standing for the individuals and organization that
sponsored Proposition 8,91 the Ninth Circuit wrote: “All that matters, for federal
standing purposes, is that the People have an interest in the validity of Proposition
8 and that, under California law, Proponents are authorized to represent the
People's interest.”92 Yet, as we know from the doctrine just discussed, neither the
89

See supra xx.
See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd; Dickerson v. U.S. Waxman v. Evans shows the limited nature of
BLAG even more sharply. In Waxman, which involved a suit by Congressional Democrats seeking
access to census information, House members submitted two amicus briefs, each opposed to the
other, with BLAG on one side and the House Democratic leadership on the other. See Louis
Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege 176 (2004).
91
The Ninth Circuit had to decide the standing question because the state of California did not
appeal from the district court’s determination that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional. [cite]
92
Perry at 1073; see also id. at 1075 (“Because the State of California has Article III standing to
defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8, and because both the California Constitution and
California law authorize ‘the official proponents of [an] initiative ... to appear and assert the state's
interest in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the
public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so,’ we
conclude that Proponents are proper appellants here.”) (internal citation omitted). Regarding this
authorization, the Ninth Circuit added that “[t]he People of California are largely free to structure
their system of governance as they choose, and we respect their choice.” Perry at 1073.
The court made a point of acknowledging, too, that state law could not sidestep Article III
constraints. Perry at 1074 (“To be clear, we do not suggest that state law has any “power directly
to enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction.” Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir.1981).
“Standing to sue in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on
the party's ... standing in state court.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985).).
90
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intervenor’s assertion of an interest nor the government’s authorization suffices to
confer standing.93 Indeed, the Supreme Court has spoken quite pointedly against
the easy attribution of standing to initiative proponents. In addressing Arizona’s
official-English initiative for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg confirmed that
“this Court has never identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified
defenders.”94
Private actors seeking to insure that the laws and Constitution are properly
enforced outside the initiative context fare no better vis a vis Article III. In fact,
the Court has repeatedly affirmed that “[a]n interest shared generally with the
public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do.”95
Nearly a century ago, the Court faced the issue of private actors seeking to ensure
government accountability in a suit by a citizen who was also a taxpayer and a
member of the American Constitution League to challenge the Nineteenth
Amendment’s ratification process.96 Although the plaintiff claimed injury in that
“[f]ree citizens would be deprived of their right to have such elections duly held,
the effectiveness of their votes would be diminished, and election expenses would
be nearly doubled,” the Court found that he lacked a sufficient interest for Article
III standing.97
Some decades later, the Court reinforced the point in rejecting taxpayer
standing to challenge a state law, explaining that the party invoking federal
jurisdiction “must be able to show . . . that he has sustained . . . some direct injury .
. . and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.’”98 And again, the Court reinforced that generalized grievances are
93

See supra at xx.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
95
Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-576). Similarly, in In Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937)
(per curiam), the Supreme Court found no Article III standing for a member of the Supreme Court
bar who sought to challenge Justice Black’s appointment based on the Constitution’s Ineligibility
Clause. The Court explained:
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public.
Id. at 634.
96
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
97
Id. at 127, 129.
98
Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (citation omitted). Not
surprisingly, then, “when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction
he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to
establish.” Lujan at 562 (citations omitted).
94
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insufficient for standing purposes in response to a federal taxpayer who sought
information about the Central Intelligence Agency’s expenditures pursuant to the
Constitution’s Statement and Account Clause so that he could “intelligently follow
the actions of Congress or the Executive” and “properly fulfill his obligations as a
member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking national office.”99 As
the Court reiterated, this desire to have the law enforced in a particular way “is
surely [] a generalized grievance . . . since the impact on him is plainly
undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’”100
Individuals who have pursued what they perceived as the government’s
interests by seeking to defend official enactments have similarly been deemed to
lack an adequately individualized stake. In Diamond v. Charles, for example, the
Court rejected a doctor’s proposed intervention to defend a state abortion
restriction on the ground that it was “simply an effort to compel the State to enact
a code in accord with [the doctor’s] interests.”101 This “expression of a desire that
[a law] as written be obeyed” is one available to the sovereign, which has a “direct
stake” in defending its laws, but not to a citizen with no individualized injury.102
But perhaps one might argue that initiative proponents are differently situated
to pursue the government’s interests when they seek to enforce a law that they
have sponsored, particularly when they have been authorized by the state, as
Proposition 8’s proponents purportedly were.103 In particular, the qui tam cases
might be invoked for support because the Court has permitted private actors to
invoke federal jurisdiction in the course of actions seeking redress related to
alleged fraud against the United States.104 In Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. U.S. ex rel Stevens, for example, the Court acknowledged that the
private actor, known as the relator, does not suffer an invasion of its own legally
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U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 (1974).
Id. at 176-77 (quoting Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
101
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986).
102
Id. at 66.
103
None of the statutes governing ballot initiative sponsors addresses, much less authorizes, those
sponsors to defend “their” measure on the state’s behalf. [cite] Although the California Supreme
Court construed them to do so and the Ninth Circuit accepted that construction, it is not clear that
that construction is warranted. [cite]
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Most qui tam suits are brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §3279(a), which permits
a private party, known as the “relator” to bring an action “for the person and for the United States
Government” against a defendant who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer
or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.” Three other statutes also allow for qui tam proceedings. See Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000).
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protected interest in a conventional sense. 105 Instead, the interest is that of the
United States and “the ‘right’ he seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize
until the litigation is completed and the relator prevails.”106 But, the Court found,
standing exists because the relator is a partial assignee of the United States’ fraud
claim, so that, when the relator files, it is pursuing its own interests.107
Unfortunately for initiative proponents, the government cannot assign the
interests that give rise to standing in this context. That is, while a government can
assign its claim for financial compensation, as in the qui tam context, its
enforcement powers are not similarly alienable.108
Perhaps initiative proponents are more like representatives of the legislature
than like assignees of the government, drawing on Karcher’s and Chadha’s
acceptance of legislative bodies’ Article III standing. 109 Here, the argument would
be that, like those leaders, the initiative proponents are preserving the voters’
power to see that their initiative-enacted laws are enforced. The difficulties with
this position, though, are several. First, it is factually weak. Sponsoring
individuals and organizations are enthusiastic supporters of proposed legislation
but they are not enactors. That role belongs to the voting public. As leading
105

Id. A concrete interest in the suit’s outcome, alone, is insufficient because, as the Court
explained, that is not necessarily an interest related to an injury in fact – even someone who has
wagered on the outcome of a lawsuit could be said to have a concrete interest. Id.
106
Id. at 773. See also id. (“[A]n interest that is merely a ‘byproduct’ of the suit itself cannot give
rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.”).
107
Id. at 773 (affirming “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in
fact suffered by the assignor”). The Court elaborated this point in Sprint Communications Co.,
L.P. v. APCC Svcs., Inc., 544 U.S. 269 (2008), where assignees of payphone operators had brought
compensation claims in federal court but had promised to pay proceeds from those claims to the
assignor. Reviewing historical practice in England and the U.S., the Court observed that “[w]here
assignment at issue, courts . . . have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit;
and . . . there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection.” Id. at 286. The
Court reinforced the point by reference to Vermont Agency, reiterating that, in the context of qui
tam claims, private actors standing arises from its possessing an assigned interest from the United
States. Id. See also id. at 289 (describing assignment as conferring a “property right”); 290
(describing assignees as asserting “legal rights of their own”) (emphasis in original).
108
Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.’”) (citation omitted).
109
A separate argument might seek to recognize initiative sponsors as an alternate legal defense
team for the state when the usual defense group is not available. Cf. Perry v. Brown, 134
Cal.Rptr.3d at 525 (“[T]he role played by the proponents in such litigation,” the court explained,
“is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in
vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a
challenged provision may be sustained.”). This is not a reading that the Ninth Circuit embraced,
see supra, nor could it have, since counsel to a party does not have standing to pursue an appeal
that the party itself declines to pursue. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 458 U.S. at 751 (requiring that a
party “allege personal injury”) (emphasis added).
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supporters, proponents are more like individual lawmakers – perhaps closest to the
lead sponsor of a piece of legislation. And individual lawmakers, as we know, may
have a cognizable interest in the voting process110 but they do not have Article III
jurisdiction for claims that would have the state enforce its laws in a particular
way.
Second, there is nothing in the initiative process framework to justify treating
proponents as the voters’ proxy in litigation, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s
suggestion in Perry that ballot measure sponsors have special, distinguishing
responsibilities.111 Unlike in legislatures, where governing rules frequently
designate the leadership to appear on the body’s behalf in a range of proceedings,
initiative statutes focus almost entirely on the steps in the process – how many
signatures must sponsors obtain to put a measure on the ballot; how those
signatures will be assessed; what sorts of information goes into a voter guide;
etc.112 Not a single provision bears remotely on enforcement, or even defense, of a
proposed measure. Against this background, the state could conceivably designate
anyone in the voting population, or even anyone at all, to handle the voters-aslawmakers enforcement action. After all, even from within the process-focused
rules, there is no requirement that the initiative sponsor be either the most effective
or the most generous initiative supporter or the one, for that matter, that the voters
would have chosen.113
In this sense, the initiative process laws on which Perry relied to distinguish
Proposition 8’s proponents from the measures’ other supporters are most
analogous to provisions that set out the legislature’s lawmaking processes. It is
not a serious argument that these sorts of measures should help an individual
legislator overcome the standing hurdle to defend a measure enacted according to
these processes; nor should it be that the analogous voter initiative provisions give
official sponsors access to federal jurisdiction once the initiative has passed.
To be sure, ballot measure proponents and individuals and organizations
involved with lobbying efforts for legislation stand out from the general public
110

See supra at xx (discussing Coleman v. Miller).
See supra at note xx and accompanying text. See also Perry v. Brown, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d at xx)
(describing initiative proponents as “the most obvious and logical persons to assert the state’s
interest,” because of their unique legal status in relation to the initiative).
112
[cite]
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The “single-subject rule” that is typically part of a voter initiative framework would likely
preclude sponsors from merging into the measure a vote on who would represent the voters’
interests if the state declined enforcement . Cf. William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay
Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct
Democracy, 55 Ohio St. L. Rev. 583 (1994).
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because of their involvement in getting a particular piece of legislation passed.
But dedication of time and resources also cannot be what confers Article III
standing on proponents to defend the measures they help pass. If it were enough,
then there should be no difference between the official ballot sponsors and other,
non-official initiative supporters that make equivalent contributions.114 In effect,
then, returning to where this Essay started, the state could choose anyone in
Defendantville to do the job of representing the voters.
Still, even if we accept initiative sponsors as the voters’ representatives, the
requisite interest for Article III standing does not follow because the voters would
be seeking federal jurisdiction for the purpose of having the state enforce the law
consistent with their preferences. That aim, as discussed above, is precisely the
sort of “generalized grievance” that the Court has rejected in the past as
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Indeed, alternative frameworks might award of standing to whoever is deemed to have
contributed most financially or otherwise. One can easily imagine scenarios where an organization
that rushed to become a measure’s official sponsor turned out not to take leadership of the initiative
campaign or even, conceivably, to support the initiative at election time. For obvious reasons,
formal deference to official sponsorship might not make sense but neither would having a court try
to sift among competing proponents to select one for the grant of standing. A resort to random
selection would likewise present many difficulties, as would the option of open-door participation.
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insufficiently particularized.115
None of this is to say that states must keep initiative proponents, organizational
advocates, or even taxpayers from intervening to defend state laws in state courts.
To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has made clear repeatedly, state courts are
not burdened by Article III’s constraints.116 But it is to say that a state cannot,
even with the best of intentions, extend its sovereignty to a private actor for
purposes of standing in federal court.
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See supra at xx; Lujan, at 573-74 (stating that an abstract interest in the government’s “proper
application of the Constitution and laws” cannot justify Article III standing); FEC v. Akins
(rejecting individual enforcement of general constitutional provisions); U.S. v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (finding no Article III standing for individuals “to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of executive or legislative action” based on “a general interest common to
all members of the public”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
Further, if we accept that the voters-as-lawmakers are entitled to access federal court to defend
their initiatives, it is not clear why they could not access federal court to assert their interests in
other ways, including to defend measures enacted by elected representatives or even to demand
particular types of legislation. Surely the voters have as much stake as their elected representatives
in defending enacted measures and in the legislative process working properly; the distinction
between direct and representative democracy should not make a difference for Article III purposes.
Yet to permit voter standing in these circumstances, even by someone purporting to represent
voters at large would be, again, to open the federal courts to those with non-particularized interests.
It could even follow, arguably, that the authority to stand in for the legislature’s interests should be
available to anyone purporting to represent the lawmaking body, whether in or outside of the
legislature. While it might be logical and convenient to reserve that role to the legislative body’s
leadership, it cannot be that the state’s grant of permission is the linchpin for representative
standing without conceding, contrary to decades of standing jurisprudence, that governments can
legislature around the strictures of Article III. [more to come]
In addition, allowing the voters to “take their state to court,” in effect, by giving them the
authority to act on the state’s behalf arguably creates a Pennhurst problem by permitting federal
courts to adjudicate alleged violations of state law. Although the California Supreme Court found
that the state had consented to being represented by the initiative proponents, it is not clear that that
consent satisfies the “clear waiver” requirement. [cites]
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Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the constraints of
Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the
limitations of a case or controversy”); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983)
(“[T]he state courts need not impose the same standing . . . that govern federal-court
proceedings.”). Cf. “Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (“Standing to sue
in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on the party's ...
standing in state court.”).
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Beyond the mantle-of-government theory - the injury-in-fact problem for
initiative proponents and legislators
Given that legislators and initiative proponents cannot claim a governmental,
or even quasi-governmental, interest, they must demonstrate another cognizable
interest if they are to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction in defense of an initiated
measure. Yet for the reasons just discussed, participation in the political process,
even as a ballot measure sponsor or lawmaker, does not give rise to the sort of
distinctive, palpable interest that generates Article III standing.
What about passion, then?117 The familiar doctrine bears repeating because, as
explored further below, concerns about excluding a measure’s most passionate
supporters seem to drive, at least subliminally, some of the judicial decisionmaking in this area.
The Court faced the question squarely over 40 years ago in Sierra Club v.
Morton, when it rejected the position that a litigant could gain standing based
either on its own commitment to an issue or as the representative of the
commitments and interests of others.118 As the Court explained in the context of
an environmental-protection suit brought under the Administrative Procedures Act,
“a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient
by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved.’”119 Since
then, the Court has reiterated the point in other contexts, too, making clear that
while an individual’s or organization’s interests might conflict sharply with the
government or other adverse party, “motivation is not a substitute for the actual
117

In most cases, litigants seeking federal court jurisdiction have suffered a palpable injury to their
economic interests, obviating the need for extended discussion of standing in those contexts. The
Court has also been clear that infringement of non-economic rights can give rise to standing. See
Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616 (1989) (“Our precedents demonstrate that a party may
establish standing by raising claims of noneconomic injury.”) (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
However, “claims of injury that are purely abstract, even if they might be understood to
lead to “the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees,” do not provide the kind of particular, direct, and concrete injury that is
necessary to confer standing to sue in the federal courts.” Id. (citation omitted). In Asarco, the
Court found that although teachers’ association members might have a particular interest in the
state’s educational system, that interest did not distinguish them, for standing purposes, from
others, including students, parents, and other citizens who might also be interested but would not
have standing. Id.
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405 U.S. 727 (1972). See id. at 736 (describing Sierra Club’s standing claim as resting on its
“longstanding concern with and expertise in such matters” being “sufficient to give it standing as a
‘representative of the public.’” (footnote omitted).
119
Id. at 739.
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injury needed by the courts . . . .”120
The Court’s explanation is as important as its conclusion because it shows why
initiative proponents and legislators cannot possibly claim Article III standing by
virtue of their heightened concern for the issue implicated by the measure they
promoted. “[I]f a ‘special interest’ in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra
Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon
which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide ‘special interest’ organization
however small or short-lived,” the Court wrote.121 It continued: “And if any
group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult
to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest
would not also be entitled to do so.”122
IV.

Procedural Legitimacy and the Costs of Exclusion

One might ask, still, whether this is the system we want or, put another way,
whether policy or other arguments ought to compel a rethinking of standing
doctrine in this area. I turn first to Court’s observations about this normative
question and then consider how thinking about the question from nonconsequentialist and consequentialist perspectives might help.
In U.S. v. Richardson, the Court confronted the consequences of its ruling that
a private party lacked standing to demand that the Central Intelligence Agency act
consistently with its constitutional obligation to provide an accounting of its
expenditures because he had not suffered a personalized injury.123 “It can be
argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so,”
the Court acknowledged. The same is true for Proposition 8 – if the state declines
to defend and the measure’s proponents lack Article III standing, the litigation
cannot properly continue past the district court.124 (The DOMA cases are
120

Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, at 226. See also id. at 225-26 (“the
essence of standing ‘is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite . . . interest
that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct.’”) (quoting Doremus v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952); U.S. v. Richardson at 177 (“While we can hardly
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418 U.S. 166 (1974).
124
There is no Article III problem in the district court because the parties invoking federal
jurisdiction the suit alleged a concrete and particularized injury brought on by the state’s refusal to
allow them to marry. [cite] Likewise, the fact that the governor and attorney general agreed with
122

36

positioned differently because the federal government has sought review in each
case.)125
The Court responded to what might seem a troubling result by situating it
within the Framers’ political vision for the United States, with the allocation of
some disputes to the judiciary and others to the political process.
The Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives
directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six
years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of
course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the ‘ground
rules' established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of the Executive
Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction
does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the
polls.126
Indeed, the Court’s observation is an important reminder that relaxing Article III’s
constraints in the context of voter initiatives or other popular measures would have
consequences that extend beyond the jurisprudential to the very nature of our
government structure. Somewhat dramatically, the Court proclaimed: “Any other
conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in
the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee
the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts.”127
Continuing, the Court made an observation that seems tailor-made for both
BLAG and Proposition 8’s proponents:
Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral
process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing
members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are
delinquent in performing duties committed to them.
In other words, when we step back to consider whether it might be best to ease
Article III’s requirements in the voter initiative context, it bears remembering that
far more is in play than the frustration of initiative supporters and supporters of a
the plaintiffs about Proposition 8’s invalidity did not vitiate the case or controversy within the
meaning of Article III; only an injunction ordering the State not to enforce the measure could
sufficiently remedy the plaintiffs’ alleged injury.
125
See supra n. xx.
126
U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
127
Id.
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particular law if a federal appeal is foreclosed.
Considering additional non-consequentialist and consequentialist arguments
for and against allowing intervention and standing in these contexts proves useful,
too. On the non-consequentialist side, we could say that permitting private actors
and legislators to participate in defending government action is a good in itself.
For initiative proponents, the argument is strongest –the very point of the initiative
process is to enable and encourage citizens to participate directly in government.
This argument could also be extended to support inclusion of legislators and even
citizen-lobbyists as defendants in suits regarding measures they supported. It is
reasonable to think that opening this part of the process could foster even greater
civic engagement. To return to the illustration from the Essay’s outset, if there
really was a Defendantville, its inhabitants presumably would feel more a part of
government if they knew they could not only advocate for laws but also defend
those laws against post-enactment challenge challenges.
More pragmatically, it seems obvious that those who are both highly
passionate and knowledgeable about a particular measure are likely to bring robust
arguments into the litigation process. And, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out,
government cannot necessarily be counted on to do the same, particularly if it
disagrees with the measure’s very merits. Indeed, to the extent citizens turned to
voter initiatives to avoid the legislature, it seems reasonable to assume that those
same citizens will be more apt to fully illuminate issues and arguments that the
reviewing court would want to consider.128
Also obvious, particularly in the voter initiative context, is that blocking
private actors from defending measures they have worked energetically to pass
could have a range of negative public effects.129 Most directly, decisions along
those lines may discourage others from becoming involved in the legislative
process. To the extent a state values its initiative system, as California does, this
risk could be seen as substantial.
Further, if courts are seen as shutting their doors to keep engaged citizens from
defending “their” laws, the risk is not only disillusionment but also heightened
distrust of the judiciary. After all, the Article III concerns that would require such
128

Yniguez at 733 (“The official sponsors of a ballot initiative have a strong interest in the vitality
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a decision are not likely to come through sympathetically, if at all, in news media
coverage.130 Indeed, general faith in government can only be hurt if the state or
federal government refuses to defend a law and the initiative proponents or
legislators who supported it are barred from taking an appeal if the measure is
struck down.
Countermajoritarian anxiety and guilt at work
These points, taken together, help to explain why some courts, perhaps
including the Ninth Circuit in Perry and the federal courts that have decided
DOMA cases, deviate from the seemingly clear limitations imposed by the federal
intervention rules and Article III when considering the role of initiative proponents
and legislators in defending official enactments. To put them into jurisprudentially
familiar terms, we might say that these courts are being driven by a combination of
countermajoritarian anxiety and countermajoritarian guilt.
On the anxiety side, the fear is, as just noted, that the adjudication process will
fall apart in some way if a ballot measure sponsor or subgroup of legislators is
denied standing to appeal the measure’s invalidation, especially in circumstances
where the government itself declines to appeal.131 The litigation might be
diminished without the benefit of the proponents’ arguments and, further, the
reputation of the court and the political process may suffer immeasurable damage
by the proponents’ exclusion.
Guilt seems also to be operative, especially in the voter initiative context.
After all, stepping back from standing doctrine’s fine points, it can seem unfair, in
a Lockean sense, to take those who labored to pass legislation and preclude them
from defending their work.132 Strains of due process jurisprudence also reinforce
this sense of countermajoritarian guilt, suggesting that it is procedurally as well as
substantively unfair to deprive ballot measure sponsors or even voters133 of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in defense of the measure they helped pass.
This anxiety and guilt, when left unexposed, risk obscuring the significant
costs associated with allowing governments to delegate their authority to private
actors and individual legislators. Most fundamentally, private parties, no matter
130

My own experience confirms that most reporters tend to avoid what they perceive as an “in the
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measure’s subject matter and consequences in the world.
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how engaged in the political process, are not subject to any of the accountabilityoriented limitations that are in place, formally and normatively, to constrain
government actors. There are no transparency requirements, few ethical
limitations, and no obligation to carry forward the public interest rather than their
own (or to take into account conflicting views of the public interest). Even
legislators, as individuals and in subgroups, are not subject to the same limitations
as the government as a whole.
Relatedly, and as a partial result of these constraints being absent, private
parties and legislative subgroups are free to argue whatever they wish in the guise
of government interests when they pursue appeals under the government’s mantle.
So, for example, Proposition 8’s sponsors could freely argue that heterosexual
parents should be privileged over gay parents134 even though California law and
policy affirmatively rejected that position. Indeed, Proposition 8’s sponsors could
have argued – as state interests – that gay people are mentally ill, child molesters,
and otherwise dangerous to society had they chosen to do so, notwithstanding that
nothing in California law supports those positions.135 The same is true for
BLAG.136 This setup presents its own sort of legitimacy risk, where courts can be
seen as giving any group – regardless of how divisive – a governmental platform
for advancing its views.
Thus, just as it seems wrong to bar private actors and legislators from
participating fully in a measure’s defense, so too does it seem wrong to allow those
actors to function as the government when they do not share the government’s
enforcement interest or accountability constraints.
Procedural accommodations
The question, then, is how, procedurally, to accommodate the assortment of
concerns in play – fairness, guilt, anxiety, and judicial legitimacy writ large –
together with the real constraints of intervention rules and Article III. Simply
condemning the concerns as unreasonable and advocating a hard doctrinal line will
not do; after all, these concerns, articulated and not, are likely to influence the
134

In fact, Proposition 8’s sponsors made this argument, asserting that “children are better off
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acceptability of any proposed solution.
With respect to guilt, which is the more inward-looking of the strands of
legitimacy concerns, it may help to recall that any deprivation caused to private
parties is not categorical. In the state court system, an initiative proponent or other
private actor can participate in a state law’s defense as fully as the state will allow,
entirely free from Article III constraints. Of course, the availability of state-court
standing will be cold comfort to an advocate if litigation is brought in federal court
and it will typically be of little help to members of Congress. In these
circumstances, perhaps the best a court can do is to provide an accessible
explanation of federal courts’ limited powers137 and to reinforce that fairness
concerns, however powerful, cannot overcome the constraints of Article III.
Countermajoritarian anxiety about deficiencies in the adjudication process and
harms to judicial legitimacy if private actors and legislators cannot intervene to
defend a challenged measure can be more readily addressed. With respect to the
process itself, amicus curiae status is already routinely granted to insure that courts
receive a robust set of arguments and to enable at least some participation by those
with a strong interest in the case.138
While amicus briefs may be adequate in most circumstances, courts might also
considering authorizing certain amici to participate more extensively in litigation.
This “litigating amicus” status has long been available, at the discretion of district
courts,139 to enable amici to engage in discovery and participate in trial, including
by calling and questioning witnesses.140 Of course, allowing extensive
137
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involvement by amici risks inefficiencies and worse,141 but enough courts have
granted litigating amicus status to suggest that careful management can control for
these problems while maximizing the benefits from the additional participation.142
Further, courts can – and already do – try to anticipate reputational backlash
from potentially divisive decisions through the way in which they communicate
their decisions. Often, in difficult circumstances, courts take space at the outset of
an opinion to explain that their judicial role requires them to do whatever they
have done.143 We see much evidence of this in the marriage cases, where
their Friends, 1790-1890, 20 Const. Comment. 111, 130 (2003); [<-need to double-check whether
these sources add value]
see also Russell v. Board of Plumbing Examiners, 74 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D. N.Y. 1999)
(observing that “[a] court can allow amici to call their own witnesses and cross examine the
witnesses of other parties” but also that litigating amici are “precluded from engaging in adversarial
activities such as motions to compel” and from taking appeals”).
141
In a strong critique of a lower court decision to permit a litigating amicus, where the amicus
had brought contempt claims against the defendant in the district court, the circuit court decried
“this legal mutant characterized as “litigating amicus curiae,” and warned that allowing such status
to non-parties “will implicate and erode the future core stability of American adversary
jurisprudence as we know it today.” U.S. v. State of Mich., 940 F.2d 143, 163-167 (6th Cir. 1991).
The court added that allowing expanded amicus participation “would extend carte blanche
discretion to a trial judge to convert the trial court into a free-wheeling forum of competing special
interest groups capable of frustrating and undermining the ability of the named parties/real parties
in interest to expeditiously resolve their own dispute and capable of complicating the court's ability
to perform its judicial function.” Id. While other courts have expressed concerns about the
litigating amicus role, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion is unusual for its energetic skepticism.
142
See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting with approval that
“counsel for amici toured [the defendant’s] facilities, located and interviewed amici's expert
witnesses, attended without participating in the depositions taken by the parties, actually
participated in the depositions of amici's witnesses, and prepared pretrial memoranda on behalf of
amici. Amici's counsel also presented amici's witnesses at trial and cross-examined plaintiffs' and
defendants' witnesses.”); Alliance of Automobile Mfrs. v. Gwadowsky, 297 F.Supp.2d 305, 306308 (D. Me. 2003) (granting “amicus curiae ‘plus’ status, but with restrictions” including
“requiring “notice and service of all documents and events just as if it were a party to the case” and
some participation in discovery and at trial but excluding “an independent right to engage in
written forms of discovery”); Daggett v. Webster, 190 F.R.D. 12, 14-15 (D. Me. 1999) (ordering
that “all documents must be given to amici as if they were parties and amici have ability to, with
witness’s acquiescence, examine or cross-examine a witness (as long as Attorney General’s office
does not also examine or cross-examine”).
143

This anticipation of countermajoritarian backlash is particularly common when courts strike
down voter initiatives. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans; [cites and additional discussion to come]. In
decisions sustaining measures they find disagreeable, courts will often state that their decision does
not endorse the wisdom of the challenged government action, or something along those lines. See,
e.g., Perry at 1073 (“It matters not whether federal courts think it wise or desirable for California to
afford proponents this authority to speak for the State, just as it makes no difference whether
federal courts think it a good idea that California allows its constitution to be amended by a
majority vote through a ballot measure in the first place.”). [more cites to come]
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decisions frequently come across as though courts are apologizing to one
disappointed constituency or another for the outcome.144 While this is no
guarantee that those careful comments will reach the general public, which
overwhelmingly learns about decisions from media accounts rather than from
judicial opinions,145 it is at least a protective step that courts can take for
themselves.
V.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, no matter how powerful the anxiety nor how wrenching
the guilt that might flow from limiting private individuals and legislators’
participation, federal courts are simply not open-door institutions for dispute
resolution, including for contentious legal and social conflicts. Instead, to grapple
realistically with intervention rules and Article III jurisprudence means that even
the most enthusiastic defenders of challenged laws cannot alchemize a cognizable
interest that their circumstances do not otherwise create. Nor can they properly
claim the mantle of governmental standing, no matter how willing the government
is to share or delegate its access.
Instead, federal courts are limited to authorizing amicus status for those whose
strongest connection to the challenged measure is an intense interest either in favor
or against. And while federal circuit courts can virtually always hear appeals from
governments desiring to defend their own laws, they cannot make space on their
docket when it is only individual citizens or legislators who are seeking review, no
matter how politically desirable that review might be.

144
145

[cites to come]
[cite]
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